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CHAPTER ONE 
THE IMPRINT OF CULTURE 
Two subjects most apt to be avoided in polite conversation are 
religion and politics. The reasons are not hard to fathom. We express 
our values and views in mixed company at the risk of exposing our 
identity: perhaps also our ignorance. Explanations are most easily 
avoided by a circumspect silence. As citizens of an increasingly 
pluralistic America, we put a premium on anonymity and privacy with 
d t l . t" 1 regar o persona convlc lons. 
Consequently, these most public of commitments--religion and 
politics--are kept most private, even secret, and guarded as 
Rumpelstiltskin guarded his name. Matters of faith tend to be consigned 
to a tacit dimension of being: a Homeric netherworld of the sort once 
inhabited by shades of the Greek dead. Religion in particular is 
becoming more mystic or ineffable, confirming psychologically a dualism 
in our thinking that has been embraced by modern philosophy. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein concluded his Tractatus on this rather diffident note: 
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 112 J. Glenn 
Gray has characterized the abstraction of modern social life as a 
3 
consequence of its godlessness. 
Religion and Politics 
We are confronted by a twin paradox in America today: the private 
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Christian and the private citizen. In a bygone generation, the 
Christian gospel was proclaimed abroad in the land. Christianity was 
recognized as part of the common law. Today, the proclamation is muted 
and the recognition of our Christian legal tradition is indistinct, even 
in the churches. The public religiosity of an earlier era has retreated 
from community life. A malaise has settled over the civil pageantry of 
this once boisterous young republic that marked time with seven league 
boots. Even the obligatory lip service paid to civic virtue by dubious 
4 politicians and doubtful citizens has grown cold. Shakespeare's Brutus 
suggested a diagnosis for times like ours: 
When love begins to sicken and decay, 
It useth an enforced ceremony. 
There are no tricks in plain and simple faith: 
But hollow men, like horses hot at hand, 
Make gallant show and promise of their mettle; 
But when they should endure the bloody spur, 
They fall their cr5sts, and, like deceitful jades, 
Sink in the trial. 
We live in an age of transition. Sporadic church attendance and 
low voter turnouts each express a growing disdain for any sort of 
confessionalism or civic obligation. Where once a confident public 
6 philosophy held court, a strident skepticism has displaced the fairly 
broad moral consensus that, according to James Hitchcock, prevailed 
"until sometime after 1960." 
While there were inevitable disagreements over values, in 
retrospect these seem to have been relatively minor in scope, 
occurring within an accepted framework of belief. To cite one 
particularly sensitive example, the nation was overwhelmingly 
family-oriented. Hence there was general agreement about the 
undesirability of divorce, unmarried cohabitation, homosexuality, 
and other practices. However common they may had been in 
actuality, there was little inclination to defend them in theory. 
Agencies of public expression, like the schools and 7he mass media, 
tended overwhelmingly to honor this moral consensus. 
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Indeed, this consensus was securely established within our legal 
system, despite some signs of fraying at the edges even before the 
1960s. A radical shattering of this outwardly Christian set of 
expectations scarcely could have been anticipated. The current 
fragmentation of values is being viewed positively within what Hitchcock 
calls the "new pluralism" as a means to effect the transition from one 
orthodoxy to another. 
While the call for "pluralism" is ostensibly merely a call for 
tolerance--a request that the reigning orthodoxy make room for 
newer "points of view"--in practice an orthodoxy which loses its 
authority has trouble even retaining the right of toleration. 
Although it is still extended bare legal toleration, in practice it 
finds itself more and more on the gefensive, its very right to 
exist challenged in numerous ways. 
The bedrock of this older orthodoxy was an accommodation between 
church and state designed to maintain standards of law and morality 
based on Christianity. The disestablishment of the state churches 
appears to have been originally intended to strengthen rather than 
impair the cooperation between church and state as institutions. This 
is attested by numerous court rulings, including the decision of the 
Supreme Court of New York in the case of People v. Ruggles, 8 Johnson 
296' 297 ( 1 811 ) : 
Though the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it 
does not forbid judicial cognisance of those offences against 
religj_on and morality which have no reference to any such 
establishment, or to any particular form of government, but are 
punishable because they strike at the root of moral obligation and 
weaken the security of the social ties .... The legislative 
expostion of the constitution is conformable to this view of it. 
Here the Court noted that "the people of this state, in common with the 
people of this country, profess the general doctrines of christianity as 
the rule of their faith and practice .... "9 While it is true that the 
16 
political system did not base itself upon a particular doctrinal 
statement, it was predominantly Christian in its legal assumptions, 
l l d l . . th. 10 mora va ues, an re lglous sympa les. 
But today there is strong evidence of a growing separation of the 
American legal and political system as a whole from its original, 
basically Christian presuppositions, raising questions of both a 
theoretical and practical nature concerning its direction. 11 The object 
of this study is to analyze and evaluate the implications of current 
public policy concerning the relationship of church and state and to do 
so in the context of a Christian philosophy of history, law, and 
government. 
Church, State, and Sovereignty 
The central questions of philosophy often lie at the frontiers of 
several disciplines. The problem of delineating the proper spheres of 
church and state, for instance, raises issues of great consequence in 
the fields of law, theology, political theory, and economics. The 
institutional conflicts between church and state nevertheless point to 
an even more fundamental question about the proper source of authority 
to which each may appeal: Who or what wields ultimate power in society? 
This is the question of sovereignty. It asks: What is the court of last 
resort? Where does the buck stop? The answers of philosophers and 
statesmen throughout history have been varied and often irreconcilable: 
the polis, the people, the king, the constitution, the church, humanity, 
destiny, and God. For our purposes here, the options ultimately boil 
down to two: God or Caesar. 
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Our American forebears were faced with the delicate task of 
founding and properly outfitting a new system of government that would 
distribute authority, protect liberty, and simultaneously guard against 
the abuses of both. By the time of the Declaration of Independence, the 
concept of legal sovereignty that had for so long been claimed by kings 
and parliaments was thoroughly discredited. 13 It is noteworthy that the 
Constitution does not even use the word sovereignty and, instead, 
reserves for itself the more modest status of "supreme law of the land," 
a concept that may be traced back to the Bible through the Magna 
14 Carta. The founders recognized that ultimate authority must be 
located at a point beyond human intervention and, hence, beyond 
politics. Noah Webster expressed a Christian understanding of 
sovereignty when he illustrated the word in his definition: "Absolute 
sovereignty belongs to God only. 1115 Without this common understanding, 
the question of who wields ultimate power necessarily becomes the 
supreme object of political contention. 
The constitutional protection of the church from intervention by 
the state is a revolutionary idea. From the earliest days of the 
church, monarchs had often claimed authoritative powers in matters of 
church doctrine and government. The authority of the Roman emperor as 
the supreme pontiff over the state religion was maintained to some 
degree even after the empire became nominally Christian. During the 
centuries that followed, emperors, popes, and kings fought to possess 
the keys to the kingdom of God. The American historian, Sanford H. 
Cobb, could thus remark with some justification that, in light of the 
long history of political absolutism, "this pure religious liberty may 
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be justly rated as the great gift of America to civilization and the 
world. !116 Although Americans tend to take this gift for granted 
today, the proper juxtaposition of church and state is still an 
unsettled question. 
Some measure of political divisiveness is to be expected when the 
place of the church in society is discussed because it involves the 
issue of ultimate allegiance. With the secularization of our cultural 
in~titutions, people's expectations about the interaction of church and 
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state have changed. Many Americans now regard the church as an 
unrepresentative special interest group and thus expect it to play a 
subordinate, even invisible, role in public affairs. This attitude is 
probably nearly as prevalent among church members as among non-members. 
Pluralism is frequently prescribed as an antidote to the 
divisiveness of religious orthodoxies and enjoys a favorable image as a 
common denominator or neutral value. 18 According to Sidney Mead, it was 
the pluralist vision of a "cosmopolitan, inclusive, universal theology" 
that guided the founders. 19 Similarly, it was an avowedly nonsectarian 
Christian moralism rather than religious skepticism that motivated 
Horace Mann and other supporters of the public education movement early 
20 in the nineteenth century. But no~ that religion is generally 
considered to be a private affair, the church as an institution is today 
being relegated to the fringes of an avowedly pluralistic secular 
society. In his study of the phenomenon of revolution during the last 
thousand years of western history, Euger. Rosenstock-Huessy detected a 
gradual reversal in the identity of the public and private realms: 
Church and economy have changed their places during the last 
thousand years .... The universal church becomes more and more 
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particular in her operations; economy becomes more and more 
universally organized. We still pray for One Catholic Church. The 
real trouble of the future will be, whether we can pray for it 
sincerely or not. It is true that for ten centuries the nations 
carried both yisions, the vision of local rights and private 
property, and the vision of a universal realm of peace. Private 
property is being attacked today on the same ground as the unity of 
faith. Both ideals are imperilled. Bolshevism is radical enough 
to make the church a private affair for the individual, and 
property the public affair of the community. But the question is 
not dependent on any subjective theory about Marxism. It is an 
issue for any government which subsidizes industry, taxes private 
educational institutions, propagates political ideas, or 
repopulates2fts deserted villages with self-subsisting homesteads. 
Indeed, some secularists nurture a hope that the church will eventually 
22 die of sheer irrelevance if left alone and unacknowledged. 
Ironically, the problem of reconciling the claims of church and 
state may be a more urgent one for a nominally secular society than for 
one in which religion officially plays a leading civic role. In the 
days when sovereignty was regarded as a transcendent concept, church and 
state at least had a common religious reference and a common source of 
appeal in Scripture, even though they may have competed for control of 
the civil sword from time to time. 23 Now that sovereignty has been 
brought down to earth in the name of the people, there is good reason to 
doubt that any institution remains sufficiently independent of the state 
to guarantee freedom of religion, or any other freedom, beyond the 
merest "considerations of what is expedient for the community 
't lf n 24 l se . 
The business of determining "community standards" is inherently 
moral or religious in nature. Indeed, morality is just as readily 
legislated as it is preached or taught. If, in fact, religiosity and 
morality are basic human traits, secularity and amorality are not their 
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opposites. The rejection of one system of values and beliefs only 
indicates that it has been replaced by another system considered more 
acceptable, believable, or valuable. If the really salient issue were 
the establishment of religion, what would be gained by a community if, 
in disestablishing the church, it simply established the state in its 
25 place? When the state itself is sovereign, what institution is 
sufficiently independent to stand apart from the state as a court of 
last resort fully equipped to assure civil and religious liberty? This 
is the dilemma posed by any establishment of religion by the state. 
This is not to deny that disestablishment has created its share of 
difficulties. Even though Christianity still outwardly prevails as the 
majority religion, our accustomed religious liberty has furnished a rich 
soil for doctrinal innovations. Otto Scott's analysis suggests some of 
the perplexities that confront historians as they interpret the nature 
of American religion: 
The United States was a government whose constitution claimed no 
higher authority than its own laws. That was essentially a lawyer's 
concept of civilization, and could be traced not to the church, but 
to Roman tradition. The novelty of a nation without an official 
religion was not fully appreciated in 1830--for no land was as 
crowded with churches and no people more prone to use religious 
terminology and Christian references in everyday speech, in their 
writings, and in their thinking, than the Americans. There was no 
question of the piety of millions. There was equally little doubt 
that they did not fully realize that a land with no religious 26 
center is a land where religion is what anyone chooses to claim. 
The varieties of religious expression are paralleled by the 
seemingly endless permutations to public law that attempt to accommodate 
them. No cultural vacuum remains unfilled for very long. The retreat 
of the church from many of its earlier social welfare and education 
commitments has been matched by the advance of the state in these same 
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areas. The one has catalyzed the other. But the state has also come to 
be regarded as a vehicle for promoting civil and religious unity and 
. l't 27 unlversa l y. World history is the story of successive empires that 
has aspired to universal dominion in one form or another, among them 
Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, Islam, Germany, Mongolia, Spain, 
England, France, the Axis, America, and Russia. 
America has long been a prolific breeding ground for new cults. In 
the absence of a healthy civil religion, almost anything goes. The 
Harvard sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin, characterized this phenomenon as 
"chaotic syncretism," which he attributed to the decomposition of an 
"overripe sensate culture." 28 Indeed, religious pluralism is just as 
problematic in its own way as the old church establishments once were 
for the American colonists. This is most strikingly reflected in the 
high level of litigation over church-state issues. The guarantee of 
religious free exercise upsets the status quo, especially once it is 
accepted as a distinct value apart from its original purpose of 
protecting dissenters--mainly Christian--from existing church 
establishments. 
Regarding matters of religious belief and practice, the state today 
affects an attitude of disinterested neutrality. In a series of 
decisions, the Supreme Court has held that every government activity 
must be guided by a secular purpose and have a neutral "primary effect 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 29 But these tests are not 
as straight-forward as they might appear to be for the simple reason 
that the effective spheres of political and religious activity cannot be 
neatly compartmentalized. Both politics and religion are comprehensive 
in their reach. Above all, they are inclusive; they are first of all 
inclusive even where they appear exclusive. Both are unavoidably 
value-laden. Neither is neutral in its effects, whether these are 
primary or subsidiary. Indeed, all perception, thought, and action 
begins with biases, presuppositions, or predilections. 30 Whether in 
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theory or in practice, neither the state nor the church is apt to always 
agree which are the things of God and which are the things of Caesar 
(Matt. 22:21 ), if they even attempt to draw a meaningful distinction 
between the secular and the sacred. If Christian believers are to 
"Render . to all their dues" (Rom. 13:7), then some yardstick is 
required to determine what is due to each. It is a problem of 
jurisdiction. 
This problem of jurisdiction has been compounded by the divided 
state of the church. Public policy unavoidably differentiates among and 
differently affects the perceptions and practices of different churches 
and church communicants. What may be regarded as welcome assistance by 
some may be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion by others. Some 
religious traditions, like Puritanism, are militantly reformational. 
Others, like the Social Gospel and liberation theology, concentrate on 
the transformation of social institutions. Anabaptists, such as the 
Mennonites, generally tend toward strict separationism and political 
. t. 31 qule lsm. Others, among them Roman Catholics, seek close cooperation 
32 between church and state. Religious liberty means something very 
different in each case. 
Particular laws and policies burden the members of some sects more 
than others. Since class legislation is still the exception rather than 
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the rule, relief is usually sought in the form of exemptions or 
favorable court rulings. But exemptions are increasingly treated as 
privileges rather then immunities; and court rulings are becoming highly 
unpredictable and subjective in the absence of a clear interpretative 
t d 't' 33 ra l lOn. General policy legislation invariably imposes hardships on 
those who, for legitimate religious reasons, cannot or will not comply. 
These hardships may be further aggravated by overly stringent and 
sometimes quite logical renderings of the vagaries of legislative 
language into administrative practice. A simple turn of phrase or an 
undefined term may inspire novel bureaucratic initiatives. The courts 
are then placed in the position of having to referee the competing 
claims of government officials, private citizens, and churches. 
The earlier cooperation that characterized the relationship of 
church and state was followed in this century by an era of relatively 
benign neglect or benevolent neutrality. But prominent religious 
leaders are now expressing their concern that the relationship is 
becoming increasingly confrontational. Numerous books and articles have 
appeared lately that criticize what the authors regard as gratuitous 
regulatory interference in areas formerly left to church contro1. 34 
Growing numbers of church members are becoming persuaded that incidents 
involving licensure and certification requirements for church-operated 
schools and day care facilities, demands for church records by revenue 
agencies, restrictions on property use by zoning authorities, and 
bureaucratic stipulations concerning the proportion of time devoted to 
"religious" as opposed to "secular" activities are not simply unforeseen 
by-products of more general policy changes, or unfortunate 
misunderstandings, but deliberate provocations by officials in pursuit 
of hostile purposes. 35 
Has the era of benign neglect of churches by the state come to an 
end? Considerable evidence suggests that the state is claiming such a 
wide scope of regulatory authority that its operations increasingly 
impinge upon routine church activities. If this is true, however, it 
may be due in no small part to the high premium many churches place on 
24 
an entangling partnership with the state in furthering either their own 
36 programs or those of the state. Neither does it necessarily or in all 
cases indicate a malicious intent. If, in fact, the religious 
institutions of our society are being brought under the effective 
supervision and control of the state, their independence is perhaps 
being most threatened by the logical consequences of an avowedly 
beneficent purpose: that is, the equalization of economic and social 
opportunities for all groups in our society. 
It serves little purpose, however, to speculate about the motives 
or intentions of legislators, bureaucrats, and judges. Although 
intent--where it may be determined--does help confirm the direction of 
the changes, what matters in this context is the impact of the policy 
changes. Despite all the talk about secular purposes and neutral 
effects, what is the object of a policy of religious pluralism--or 
syncretism--if not the formation of "a more perfect union" on the basis 
of some variety of universalism? It is precisely here--in the realm of 
ideology--that the concern of churches with their doctrinal integrity 
and their customary immunity from state intervention in the form of 
regulation or taxation may come into conflict with the state's interest 
25 
in ideological and administrative consistency. Exceptions admitted by 
either side tend to dilute the impact of its claims to authority in its 
37 proper sphere. 
How then may the current state of affairs best be understood? Have 
the most important conflicts between church and state already been 
resolved through a series of imperfect but generally agreeable 
compromises, or are the complexities of the issues only just now coming 
to the surface? 
The thesis of this dissertation may be stated in terms of a 
conflict of jurisdiction between church and state. As the state extends 
its operations into all areas of social life, it breaches the protective 
"wall of separation" that has traditionally kept the church free of 
obtrusive regulation by the civil authorities. The widening scope of 
official state activity is manifested in several ways: first, a 
statutory extension of state police powers through social legislation 
over what are still widely regarded as ecclesiastical and domestic 
spheres of authority through social legislation; second, a restriction 
or preemption of certain activities involving commerce, employment, and 
social relations--whether conducted in public or in private--that were 
once held to be outside the jurisdiction of the state; third, a 
vitiation of the principle of religious noninterference through judicial 
interpretations that divorce the "establishment" and "free exercise" 
clauses of the First Amendment, and fourth, an adversary posture toward 
churches being taken by many agencies of the state while pursuing their 
l t b . t. 38 regu a ory o Jec lves. As a consequence, churches are facing new 
restraints on their ecclesiastical or corporate rights, immunities, and 
privileges. 
A number of presuppositions underlie this thesis statement that 
have influenced the manner of its investigation and elaboration. 
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First, religion is a comprehensive human activity that embraces all 
of life, particularly the rules and values of society. The Christian 
theologian, R. J. Rushdoony, maintains that "all law is enacted morality 
... and all morality presupposes a religion as its foundation." 39 
Paul Tillich's very broad definition of religion as an "ultimate 
concern," which has been cited by the Supreme Court, includes theistic, 
pantheistic, and atheistic religion within its compass. 40 
Second, the comprehensiveness of religion means that religious 
neutrality is a myth. Francis J. Powers has written that "an attitude 
of indifference or neutrality toward religion, on the part of the state, 
is theologically and philosophically untenable. 41 
Third, the American constitutional system is essentially Christian 
in its foundational character and assumptions. Justice William 0. 
Douglas acknowledged this when he wrote that "a 'religious' rite which 
violates standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true 
sense, in the constitutional sense, included within 'religion,' the 
'free exercise' of which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 1142 From 
the bench, he reiterated an assumption in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 
306, 313 (1952) that has frequently been stated by the Court: ''We are a 
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 
Fourth, the legal heritage of our country is Christian at its 
roots. Sir Matthew Hale's maxim that Christianity is part of the common 
law was often cited by early members of the American judiciary, both in 
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their written opinions and their scholarly commentaries. For example, 
in his treatise on constitutional limitations, Chief Justice Thomas M. 
Cooley of Michigan wrote: 
The Christian religion was always recognized in the administration 
of the common law; and so far as that law continues to be the law 
of the land, the fundamental principles of that religion must 
continue to E3 recognized in the same cases and to the same extent 
as formerly. 
What may be concluded from these observations, finally, is that 
perhaps too much attention has been paid to the alleged secularization 
of our political institutions and not enough to the religious and 
political presuppositions that have favored such an interpretation. In 
recent years, it appears that the state has been assuming--whether 
44 intentionally or not--the essential attributes of a church. Far from 
pursuing a separationist course, the state has consistently attempted to 
convert churches and other institutions into instruments of its own 
social programs and has enlisted their cooperation or acquiescence by 
the granting and withholding of favors. 45 This is by no means an 
exclusively American problem. Writing in the 1930s, Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy depicted it as part of a universal modern trend: 
The world owes it to the British Commonwealth that during the last 
centuries, donations, endowments, voluntary gifts, have been the 
mainspring of progress in many fields. Were it not for the right 
of man to do what he liked with his property little would exist in 
religion, art, science, social and medical work today. No king's 
arbitrary power was allowed to interfere with a man's last will as 
expressed in his testament. On the independence of 10,000 fortunes 
a civilization was based that allowed for a rich variety of special 
activities introduced by imaginative donors and founders. The ways 
of life explored under the protection of an independent judiciary 
form a social galaxy. Our modern dictators, however, are cutting 
deeply into this tradition. This is achieved through progressive 
taxation of inheritance or limitation of a man's right over his 
property, by subsidizing institutions, like Oxford, which were 
independent formerly .... The famous Dartmouth case which Daniel 
Webster won against the State (a striking example of the 
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progressive significance of the Whiggish principle) was tried only 
a century ago; yet the conditions which made it possible £gr 
Webster to win are rapidly vanishing, at least in Europe. 
Exemptions that were designed to protect religious liberties are 
now perceived in some political circles either as customary privileges 
which are not binding on the state or else as bargaining chips with 
which to advance its policies. The wall of separation, as it now 
stands, appears to be a permeable one that simultaneously consigns 
churches--often with their cheerful cooperation--to a position of 
irrelevance within the contemporary American culture and enables the 
state to absorb their traditional functions and prerogatives. Indeed, a 
retrospective look at the record suggests that the courts, legislatures, 
and bureaucracies of the land have become involved in an experiment to 
gradually disengage our political system from its dominant religious and 
legal heritage. 47 Secular equivalents to religious institutions now 
promote human relations, education, health, and welfare in a manner 
reminiscent of William James's proposal for "a moral equivalent of 
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war." 
Although education has been at the center of much of the conflict 
in recent years, school issues are only the most visible part of a more 
fundamental clash of religious values. Richard E. Morgan regards the 
"governmentalization of welfare services" and the "educational 
revolution" as the two major trigger issues that have led to a growing 
conflict between church and state due to the rise of a reaction in the 
1960's against "the traditional ideology of privatism." Morgan adds: 
These radical secularists tend to regard private charitable 
activity as illusory and psychologically corrupting, and the notion 
of religious institutions administering public funds is anathema. 
Religious schools are seen as especially regressive .... There 
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is, it should be noted, a direct conflict between the radical 
secularist demand for governmentalization of social welfare and 
education, and the principle of "subsidiarity" which looms large in 
Catholic social thought. As formulated by Pius XI, this holds that 
it is "unjust" and "gravely harmful to turn over to a greater 
society . . . functions and services which can be performed by 
lesser bodies .... " Thus families and private associations 
should handle all possible functions, and nothing which they4§re 
capable of doing should be displaced "upward" to government. 
At stake is who or what will define the political and social agenda 
of the future. It is a question of whose vision of the future, whose 
values, whose religion will prevail. Since church and state are so 
influential in shaping public opinion, both have long been utilized as 
ideological proving grounds by various social movements seeking to mold 
society according to the desire of their hearts. Possibly as a 
consequence, church and state now claim overlapping spheres of 
authority. If they continue to find themselves at cross-purposes, each 
may be expected to assert an independent claim--perhaps even a monopoly 
of competence--over areas of that are of mutual concern. 
More than any other social institution today, excepting the family, 
the church derives its original identity and authority from a source 
50 that is independent of the state. The church steadfastly maintains 
that it answers to a higher authority regarding its sacraments, 
ceremonies, disciplines, and doctrines. Otherwise it risks becoming a 
creature or appendage of the state. The state is equally steadfast in 
upholding its immediate responsibility regarding the protection of 
public health, safety, welfare, morals, and peace. But the sphere of 
its interests has grown so large that the state is again coming into 
direct competition with the church and has begun asserting regulatory 
control over many church activities as a sovereign right. The concept 
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of the church as a "charitable public trust," which is a holdover from 
the days of established churches, has opened the door to inroads by the 
state into church affairs as, for instance, in California, where the 
Worldwide Church of God was temporarily placed into receivership by the 
Attorney General and more than sixty churches were recently threatened 
with sale for back taxes over a dispute concerning filing 
. t 51 requlremen s. 
Several consequences appear to follow from the expansion of 
jurisdiction and the tightening of regulations by the state: first, a 
decline of civil and religious liberty in those areas of public life 
where explicitly religious expression is either excluded, as in the 
public school classroom and auditorium, or where it is otherwise made 
unwelcome, as in the use of some public facilities for religious 
gatherings and displays; 52 second, a withering away of independent 
public institutions--sometimes called "mediating structures" 53--in favor 
of agencies dominated, subsidized, or otherwise regulated by the state; 
and third, an attitude among some public officials that may be described 
. . . . th . t . 54 as mlsslonary, messlanlc, or au orl arlan. 
The relationship between church and state tends to fall into one of 
several categories: first, a union of church and state in which 
dissenters are persecuted; second, a union of church and state in which 
dissenters are tolerated; third, a separation of church and state in 
which believers are persecuted; and fourth, a separation of church and 
state in which religious liberty prevails. 55 But these categories are 
not necessarily exclusive. In ancient Rome, licensed religions were 
tolerated and unlicensed ones were persecuted. Historical circumstances 
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have also depended on whether the state dominates the church or the 
church dominates the state. The prevalent pattern since the rise of 
nation-states has been a union of church and state in which the state 
dominates the church. 
Historical experience--if not logic--shows religion and politics to 
be inseparable. Each is an arena for the interplay of basic beliefs 
about human nature, power, and society. Each is an expression of faith 
guided by presuppositions that are never finally definitive or 
indisputable. 56 But this is far from saying that faith is a blind guide 
or that all answers are ultimately relative and situational. So it may 
be appropriate to reflect briefly on the practical effects of belief as 
a prelude to considering the historical and ideological issues that have 
shaped our understanding of church and state in contemporary America. 
A Cautionary Tale 
Power has only the force we are willing to attribute to it; even 
the most brutal power is founded on belief. We credit it with the 
ability to act at all times and everywhere, whereas, in reality it 
can only act at one point and at a certain moment. In short, all 
power is exactly in the position of a bank whose existence depends 
on the sole probability (incidentally, very great) that all its 
clients will not come at once to draw out their deposits. If, 
either constantly or at a particular moment, a certain power were 
summoned to bring its real force to bear in its empiST' its 
strength at each point would be about equal to zero. 
--Paul Valery, 1932 
The medium of exchange in politics is power. It is the all-purpose 
lubricant for oiling the machinery of government and greasing the palms 
of public servants. Yet, for all that, it is often regarded as 
something imaginary. For who has ever beheld power or employed it in 
its original or pure state? All that we know of power is the 
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reputation that precedes it and the results that follow. Like a 
catalyst, it cements alliances without entering into any. Only when we 
realize that "power ... is essentially a spiritual value" do we 
"glimpse into the fiduciary life of the world, founded on confidence in 
man and in the future." 58 
But we must be careful. Whether that confidence is well-placed or 
mistaken is not itself a political question. It is a philosophical and, 
even more, a theological one. The nature of our confidence is disclosed 
on the touchstone of our "idea of man." 
All politics imply a certain idea of man. In vain do we limit 
political objectives, make then as simply or as crude as possible, 
all politics imply a cer~~in idea of man and of the mind, and a 
conception of the world. 
The political essays of Paul Valery, the early hJentieth century 
French poet, may be taken as an illustration. These essays are animated 
with an obvious affection for the life of the mind and the candor of an 
uneasy skepticism. Like Friedrich Nietzsche, Valery sprinkled his 
transparent prose with elegant turns of phrase and sparkling epigrams, 
all the while diagnosing what appeared to him as the terminal condition 
of the modern intellect. He opened his 1919 essay, "The Crisis of the 
Mind," with a somber pronouncement: "We later civilizations ... we 
60 too now know that we are mortal." 
So many horrors could not have been possible without so many 
virtues. Doubtless, much science was needed to kill so many, to 
waste so much property, annihilate so many cities in so short a 
time; but moral qualities in like gymbers were also needed. Are 
Knowledge and Duty, then, suspect? 
The First World War had shattered faith in reason. It was with no 
little irony that Valery wrote of his idol, the intellect: "All our 
language is composed of brief little dreams and the wonderful thing is 
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that we sometimes make of them strangely accurate and marvellously 
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reasonable thought." Like Francisco Goya, Valery grew to believe that 
"the dream of reason produces monsters." Or as the Greeks expressed it: 
hubris begets nemesis. After the same fashion, Fyodor Dostoevsky 
speculated that out of the promethean optimism of western humanism 
modern man had built for himself crystal palaces too_ cold and sterile 
for human habitation. Valery similarly imagined "an intellectual 
Hamlet, meditating on the life and death of truths."63 
By giving the name of progress to its mvn tendency to a fatal 
precision, the world is seeking to add to the benefits of life the 
advantages of death. A certain confusion still reigns; but in a 
little while all will be made clear, and we shall witness at last 
the mirag~e of an animal society, the perfect and ultimate 
anthill. 
These words expressed Valery's judgment, if not yet history's last 
final verdict, on the corrosive effects of the Cartesian world-view, a 
view to which Valery subscribed. His aim was to show what the mind "has 
made of the world and how, in particular, it has produced modern 
society, in which order and disorder, equally and for the same reason, 
are its handiwork." 65 Rene Descartes had begun with the premise, 
"Cogito, ergo sum." Valery carried this thought to its extreme and 
discovered a dilemma. Starting with the self, how does one arrive at 
society? Or vice versa? 
On the one hand, the mind is opposed to the mass: it wants to be 
itself, and even to extend, endlessly, the domain in which the self 
is master. On the other hand, it is forced to recognize society, a 
world of wills and human hopes all limiting one another; and 
sometimes it wag5s to perfect, at other times to destroy, the order 
it finds there. 
This is the ancient dilemma of "the one and the many." It is also, 
for the Christian, a consequence of the fall of man into sin. The 
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typical response in western philosophy has been to reify, or 
materialize, the dialectic of propositional thought. Hence, we tend to 
think dualistically: mind and matter, grace and nature, realism and 
nominalism. But by choosing, we impale ourselves on one or another horn 
of the dilemma. 
. . In the modern world the difference between the idea of man 
proposed by science and philosophy and the idea of man implied in 
our legislation and all our political, moral, or social no5tons, is 
increasing. There is already an abyss between them. . . . 
The difference persists. The crisis of the mind depicted by Valery 
was--and is--a crisis of confidence, which is to say, a crisis of faith. 
He conceded as much: "Let me first say that the whole social structure 
is founded on belief and trust. All power is based on these 
psychological traits." 68 But belief in what? Trust in whom? 
. The growth ... of the positivist mentality is undermining 
the ancient foundations of society. 
It must be acknowledged that our ruin has been hastened by the 
greatest minds (Voltaire, for example). Even in the sciences the 
task of criticism has proved singularly necessary and fruitful. 
The greatest minds are always skeptical minds. Yet they do believe 
in something; they believe in whatever makes them greater. This 
was the case, for example, with Napoleon, who believed in his star, 
that is, himself. Now, not to believe in the common beliefs6 ~s 
obviously to believe in oneself, and often in oneself alone. 
The idea of man implied by modern politics is a broken one. The 
God who created man in his own image man is replaced by a new idol, such 
as Valery's notion of the intellect. But the alter ego of the 
rationalist is the skeptic. By coveting a place on a pedestal or throne 
of its own making, the intellect risks being toppled by its own 
iconoclastic whims. The rebel will not abide any god, not even himself. 
If he despises a mere earthly domain and seeks dominion over all that 
his mind surveys, he is apt to end up chasing phantoms in a frenzied 
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dialectic, as Henri Bergson recognized. 70 The modern skeptic, in 
denying his creaturehood, may fancy himself either a plaything of chance 
or a ward of the state, but very often adopts both views. 71 
But perhaps the claim to total freedom is a demand for total 
contro1. 72 In his treatise on natural law, Heinrich Rommen asserts: 
the doctrine of autonomy of human reason . . . led straight to an 
extravagance of syllogistic reasoning, of deductively constructed 
systems that served to regulate all legal institutions down to the 
minutest detail: the civil law governing debts, property, the 
family, and inherit~nces as well as constitutional and 
international law. 
By the time of Valery, the dream of reason had become so involuted in 
its dialectic that little remained besides its paradoxes. At each point 
in its empire its strength was about equal to zero. 
Valery could not see beyond this apparent chaos. His was a vision 
of an intellectually insolvent western civilization in the two decades 
following the First World War: "· .. Our Hamlet of Europe is watching 
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millions of ghosts." His contemporary, William Butler Yeats, who was 
prone to mysticism, wrote: "Things fall apart: the center cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. . "75 Many concluded that 
civilization had reached an impasse; the tree of knowledge had borne 
evil fruit. A general political and cultural run on the bank took place 
in those years. 
The moral of the tale is summed up in the title of a book by 
Richard Weaver: "Ideas Have Consequences." 76 Valery's idea involved a 
conflict between reason and the social order: 
Thought has to develop, and it has to be preserved. It can advance 
only by extremes, but it can endure only by means. Extreme order, 
which is automatism, would be its ruin; 77treme disorder would 
bring it even more quickly to the abyss. 
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Elsewhere, Valery wrote that the ever tighter rational organization of 
the world is making "the vagueness of vague things ... more and more 
obvious.n78 He believed that the social, judicial, and political worlds 
are essentially mythical worlds, the products of "a host of more or less 
venerable sentiments that all oddly intermingle and combine.n 79 
If we tried to apply, in the realm of politics, the ideas 
about man which we find in the current doctrines of science, life 
would probably become unbearable for most of us. There would be a 
general revolt of feeling in the face of such strict application of 
perfectly rational data. For it would end, in fact, by classifying 
each individual, invading his personal life, sometimes86illing or 
mutilating certain degenerate or inferior types .... 
Valery wanted to shut the gates against a diffusion of the 
81 intellectual capital of Europe throughout the world. By contrast, a 
contemporary of his, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, welcomed a dawning of 
universal history: "The flag of humanity overshadows all the national 
flags. Mere distance no longer makes us act as foes and 
belligerents."82 But he also observed that, as a consequence, all wars 
were becoming civil wars or revolutions. The machinery of war was 
coming to be used more and more for internal purposes. "It is a great 
moment in the history of humankind when the energies of the race shift 
from martial laws to civil emergency laws. The armies enlisted against 
territorial enemies are superseded or outstripped by armies enlisting 
against nature.n83 Society now had to contend with a new reality that 
both divided and redefined it. "This is a stage of human growth in 
which common language and traditional values lose their grip on the 
individual. We see him falter." 84 
Ideas have consequences. Paul Valery wrote as a person caught in 
the transition from one idea of man to another, who had to endure what 
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he thought would be unbearable but to which later generations have 
become somewhat adjusted. Richard Weaver's observations bears directly 
on the checkered history of the subject at hand: the relationship 
between church and state. Equally applicable is Valery's observation 
that all politics presupposes or implies a certain idea of man. Apart 
from what we may consider normal institutional rivalries, the historic 
issue between church and state involves ultimate values, loyalties, and 
obligations: what Valery, like Wittgenstein, considered vague things. 
The question is simply this: what idea of man will prevail and who 
will set the cultural agenda? Despite the frequent vagueness of the 
ideological justifications offered by each side, a "fatal precision" 
often characterizes the points at issue so that otherwise minor 
considerations become major tests of will. There are no neutral corners 
in matters of faith and politics. Every choice is an act of faith and a 
commitment to a point of view. The way we address issues bears witness 
to where we place our confidence. This is just as true of institutional 
decisions. As Valery recognized, even the most brutal power is founded 
on belief. Church and state share a common language--the lingua franca 
of faith--and must appeal to sources and symbols of power that are often 
identical. The bone of contention between them hinges on the issue of 
sovereignty: Who makes the rules, when, where, and on what authority? 
The nature of the issue is well stated by R. J. Rushdoony: 
Must of the present concern about the trends of these times is 
literally wasted on useless effort because those who guide the 
activities cannot resolve, with the philosophical tools at hand to 
them, the problem of authority. This is at the heart of the 
problem of the proper function of government, the power to tax, to 
conscript, to execute for crimes, and to wage warfare. The 
question of authority is again basic to education, to religion, and 
to the family. Where does authority rest, in democracy or in an 
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elite, ~g the church or in some secular institution, in God or in 
reason? 
Our consideration of the relationship between church and state in 
America will be directed toward an understanding of some of the 
political conflicts generated as a consequence of maintaining an 
institutional separation of church and state as independent spheres of 
authority. 
The Dynamics of the Problem 
The dichotomy of church and state confronts us, initially and 
finally, as a political problem. It is a problem that began at a 
specific place at a specific time in a specific political context: the 
imperial reign of the Roman Caesars. As one writer notes: "In ancient 
times, as in primitive society today, there existed no problem of Church 
and State, for the very good reason that no church, in the modern sense 
of the word, existed." 86 While the issue between them has not troubled 
all climes and all seasons equally, it looms large in the history of the 
West. Religion at one time served mainly as an accessory of statecraft. 
The advent of Judaism and Christianity set new forces into motion that 
freed religious energies from a preoccupation with parochial loyalties. 
How the church--specifically the Christian Church--emerged independent 
of the state and how the two have interacted since that time are the 
subjects of this dissertation. 
The problem may be explored in any of several dimensions. The 
political dimension may be brought into focus with a question: How can 
two distinct institutions, similar or overlapping in composition, make 
authoritative yet independent claims to the obedience and loyalty of 
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their members? The durability of the coexistence of church and state 
may be regarded as a major catalyst in the development of western 
political traditions. Their rivalry in matters of jurisdiction often 
prompted accommodations which have served as prototypes for subsequent 
political innovations. American federalism, for example, owes many of 
its essential features to Puritan political experiments in colonial New 
England. Various constitutional liberties and concepts of limited 
government derived much of their original impetus from struggles for 
religious freedom. 
This suggests another question: What circumstances permitted such a 
conflict of authority to be resolved by limiting the jurisdiction of the 
state? The ingredients for an understanding are stored in the 
laboratory of history. Issues raised during earlier religious 
controversies provide a basis for analyzing current disputes. Early 
Christians and Jews challenged the state cult of imperial Rome by 
refusing obeisance to Caesar as their lord or master. Both groups 
sought immunity from the religious laws and had to endure periods of 
official persecution while defending their distinct identity and way of 
life. 
A third dimension, the ideological, is arguably the most important 
to a recognition of what is at stake on both sides. It involves a 
different question: How is it possible to establish and maintain a 
political consensus without bringing all authority under one sovereign 
head? Differing perceptions of sovereignty, law, and citizenship may, 
after all, indicate seriously divided loyalties. Where social 
institutions fall out of step with each other and unifying traditions 
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are weakened, even ordinary stresses may threaten political disruption 
and demoralization. The ability of a society to face change and 
conflict with unity and equanimity is a measure of its moral health. 
Common values and a common political agenda are generally preferred as a 
society's first line of defense. Normally this means an assimilation of 
all groups and traditions to some existing or purposely devised set of 
norms. This function is usually filled by a civil religion. 
It is sometimes objected that the relationship between church and 
state is not characteristically political and, compared with earlier 
eras, is no longer a matter of particular concern in a modern secular 
society. The contemporary American church--if it may be described in 
the singular--does not press a distinctly political claim. Its 
ordinances are not comparable in nature or force to those of the state. 
Moreover, people expect that questions of faith today be left to the 
private dictates of individual consciences. The church that addresses 
political issues or otherwise imposes its separate will overreaches 
these customary limits at its own peril. 
While this point may be conceded in part, it fails to consider the 
dynamic nature of religion, particularly Christianity. Changes in 
political circumstances or religious priorities may redefine, even 
shatter, any existing accommodation between church and state. American 
political institutions have long operated on the basis of shared moral 
values and assumptions that derive in large part from the Bible and 
Christianity. 87 It is worth considering whether and how well such 
institutions can work under a deliberately secular, pluralistic regime. 
In the absence of a common moral ground that can help channel conflict, 
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secular or religious militancy may stir up fear and reaction. The 
volume of current legislation and litigation concerning religious issues 
is a sign of growing dissension over the proper role of the state in 
religion and the church in public life. 
As to whether this is a political question, then, the objection may 
be met very simply: any association between church and state is 
unavoidably political. On the one hand, the state values religion--at 
least in the generic sense--as a means of upholding an ideological 
consensus and encouraging civil peace. On the other hand, the Christian 
Church is historically called to acknowledge "one Lord, one faith, one 
baptism" (Eph. 4:5): which is to say, one citizenship in which all final 
authority is vested in a sovereign God. Such a claim is treasonable if 
the state--if Caesar--is rightfully sovereign. Here, as always, the 
issue is joined. It is a suitable point of departure for a historical 
study of the problem. 
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